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Introduction: European refugee law
and transnational emulation
hlne lambert
Europe has the most advanced regional protection regime in the world.
The regime has taken shape through a series of legal undertakings on
asylum, refugee law principles and human rights betweenMember States
of the European Union (EU), aiming at an ever-greater uniformity in the
law and practice of its members. The EU sought to codify a common
regional system of asylum by 2012, in order to provide a single asylum
procedure and a uniform protection status.1 A regime covering twenty-
four countries,2 including some of the most developed and powerful in
the world, is bound to exert considerable inﬂuence beyond Europe. The
predicted impact of this body of EU norms has been widely identiﬁed in
the academic literature as one that will have a ‘ripple effect’ beyond the
EU, particularly with respect to the evolving content of international
refugee law by means of changing customary law and UNHCR practice.3
However, very few studies have noted the fact that the European pro-
tection regime has already inﬂuenced the law and practice of States
1 Art. 78(2), Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, as amended by the Treaty
of Lisbon, which entered into force on 1 December 2009 (OJ 2010 No. C 83/47).
2 Denmark opted out entirely of the asylum package; both the UK and Ireland opted out of
most of the second phase (recast) of EU legislation.
3 B. S. Chimni, ‘Reforming the International Refugee Regime: A Dialogic Model’ (2001) 14
Journal of Refugee Studies 151–68, at 157; Volker Türk and Frances Nicholson, ‘Refugee
Protection in International Law: An Overall Perspective’, in Erika Feller, Volker Türk and
Frances Nicholson (eds.), Refugee Protection in International Law: UNHCR’s Global
Consultations on International Protection (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
2003), p. 6; Catherine Dauvergne, Making People Illegal (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2008), pp. 150–3; Guy S. Goodwin-Gill, ‘The Search for the One,
True Meaning. . .’, in Guy S. Goodwin-Gill and He´lène Lambert (eds.), The Limits of
Transnational Law: Refugee Law, Policy Harmonization and Judicial Dialogue in the
European Union (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), at pp. 238–9.
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around the world, for some time.4 The implications of this are great, in
terms of understanding the global reach of regional systems of law, and
how this shapes the relationship between international rules and stand-
ards, and national law and practice across the world when it comes to
refugee protection.
This volume explores the extent to which European (or EU) legal norms
of refugee protection have been emulated in other parts of the world, and
assesses the implications of these trends. At times, the norms may not have
had much discernible inﬂuence. This, too, is of interest. The aim of this
volume is thereforemore evaluative than speculative.We believe that now is
a good time to take stock and assess the inﬂuence of European refugee law
beyond the EU. This is because the ﬁrst phase of the Common European
Asylum System (CEAS) legislation (which codiﬁes over twenty years of
State practice) has concluded, and it is therefore a useful point in time to
look both backwards and forwards. Thus, the volume examines how the
European protection regime has (or has not) inﬂuenced national refugee
law and protection practice in a range of States around the world. This is
evaluated in two respects: ﬁrst, in terms of the extent of inﬂuence (e.g.,
partial or total and the content of the norm being emulated), and second, in
terms of the processeswhereby emulation of the European protection regime
has occurred (e.g., through transnational network, international or local
actors). We examine the extent and processes of emulation in seven case
studies: Africa, Australia, Canada, Israel, Latin America, Switzerland and
the United States. The chosen cases seek to reﬂect a range of broad legal
characteristics (e.g., diversity of civil/common law traditions) as well as
characteristics more speciﬁc to refugee law (e.g., States with national refugee
determination systems versus those that rely on UNHCR for this function)
and EU law (e.g., States which have formal bilateral agreements with the EU
versus States which do not, and therefore where diffusion may be said to be
more natural). Crucially, we have selected case studies that enable us to
explore the degree to which EU refugee law is emulated or eschewed, and
whether this is done expressly or ‘by stealth’. In this regard, for example, the
case study on the United States is important in identifying and explaining
the lack of transnational dialogue and emulation, thereby capturing the
limits of diffusion of European refugee law. By contrast, the case studies of
Switzerland, Israel, Australia, Canada, Africa and to some extent also Latin
4 One such study to note this to be the case in Africa is Bonaventure Rutinwa, ‘The End of
Asylum: The Changing Nature of Refugee Policies in Africa’ (2002) 21 Refugee Survey
Quarterly 2–41, at 33.
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America provide clear evidence of emulation, albeit in the case of Africa, this
evidence is more historical than modern. Overall, the number and range of
cases enables us to produce robust generalizations about the global reach of
European norms in the area of international protection.
The Global Reach of European Refugee Law takes forward the research
agenda ﬁrst laid out by Goodwin-Gill and Lambert in The Limits of
Transnational Law: Refugee Law, Policy Harmonization and Judicial
Dialogue in the European Union.5 Where The Limits of Transnational law
explored the extent of transnational judicial dialogue within the EU (and
explained why there was less than might be expected), The Global Reach of
European Refugee Law examines the worldwide emulation of key norms of
European refugee protection through transnational processes and actors.
Regarding terminology, the term ‘law’ in this volume is used in a norma-
tive sense, interchangeably with ‘norm’: that is, as principled beliefs about
appropriate action, shared by a community, which are embedded in practice
and codiﬁed in rules (i.e., law).6 The word ‘European’ is used interchange-
ably with ‘European Union (EU)’ to capture the inﬂuence of the wider
Europe of the Council of Europe on the EU, unless speciﬁed otherwise.
‘Emulation’ is understood to mean a process of diffusion. The word ‘reach’
in the title of the volume is used in its ordinary meaning in order to capture
both the scope of the study and the capability of the emulation in terms of
distance, length, degree and range. Finally, ‘refugee law’ in the context of this
book is synonymous with the EU concept of ‘international protection’: it
encompasses both the law under the 1951 Refugee Convention/1967
Protocol (that is, the law of ‘refugee protection’ stricto sensu), and other
forms of protection under international human rights treaties. In the EU
context, international protection generally translates into asylum, under-
stood as ‘the right of residence’.7
5 Guy S. Goodwin-Gill and He´lène Lambert (eds.), The Limits of Transnational Law:
Refugee Law, Policy Harmonization and Judicial Dialogue in the European Union
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010).
6 Alexander Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1999); Martha Finnemore, National Interests in International Society (Ithaca, NY:
Cornell University Press, 1996); Wayne Sandholtz and Kendall Stiles, International Norms
and Cycles of Change (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009). See also Rosalyn Higgins,
Problems and Process: International Law and HowWe Use It (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995),
pp. 1–16.
7 Arts. 13 and 18, Directive 2011/95/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13
December 2011 on standards for the qualiﬁcation of third-country nationals or stateless
persons as beneﬁciaries of international protection, for a uniform status for refugees or for
european refugee law & transnational emulation 3
C:/ITOOLS/WMS/CUP-NEW/4028023/WORKINGFOLDER/LART/9781107041752C01.3D 4 [1–24] 25.4.2013 10:10AM
A Worldwide emulation of Europe: drivers and facilitators
A core proposition of this volume is that States worldwide have been
copying, to varying degrees, European norms of refugee protection for
some time. In other words, this pattern of emulation is historical, and the
1951 Refugee Convention may be seen in terms of similar pattern of
worldwide adoption of Western norms encoded in an international legal
instrument providing rights for refugees (see discussion in Chapter 7 on
Africa).
There is a sizeable body of literature on the possible global inﬂuence of
the EU, both in the socio-legal literature on the diffusion of law8 and in
the area of political science/political sociology of the EU.9 Up to now,
most European legal scholars have taken a ‘European integration’
approach to ‘European asylum law’ and have focused on EU institutional
development and the effects of EU law on Member States.10 At the same
time, American scholars have for some time highlighted the global
promise of European legal institutions.11 More speciﬁcally, recent work
by Fullerton highlights the signiﬁcance of the new EU provisions con-
cerning war refugees on the policy debate on asylum in the United
persons eligible for subsidiary protection, and for the content of the protection granted (recast)
(OJ 2011 No. L 337/9).
8 See, e.g., William Twining, Globalisation and Legal Theory (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2000); ‘Diffusion of Law: A Global Perspective’ (2004) 49 Journal of
Legal Pluralism 1–45; ‘Social Science and Diffusion of Law’ (2005) 32 Journal of Law and
Society 203–40; ‘Normative and Legal Pluralism: A Global Perspective’ (2010) 20 Duke
Journal of Comparative & International Law 473–517; Gunther Teubner, ‘Legal
Irritants: Good Faith in British Law or How Unifying Law Ends up in New
Divergences’ (1998) 61 Modern Law Review 11–32.
9 See, e.g., Eiko Thielemann and Nadine El-Enany, ‘Refugee Protection as a Collective
Action Problem: Is the EU Shirking Its Responsibilities?’ (2010) 19 European Security
209–29; Andrew Geddes, Immigration and European Integration: Beyond Fortress
Europe? (2nd edn, Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2008), pp. 170–85;
Ian Manners, ‘Normative Power Europe: A Contradiction in Terms?’ (2002) 40
Journal of Common Market Studies 235–58.
10 See, e.g., Elspeth Guild and Carol Harlow (eds.), Implementing Amsterdam: Immigration
and Asylum Rights in EC Law (Oxford: Hart, 2001); Anneliese Baldaccini, Elspeth Guild
and Helen Toner (eds.), Whose Freedom, Security and Justice? EU Immigration and
Asylum Law and Policy (Oxford: Hart, 2007).
11 Eric Stein, ‘Lawyers, Judges, and the Making of a Transnational Constitution’ (1981) 75
American Journal of International Law 1–27; Anne-Marie Burley and Walter Mattli,
‘Europe Before the Court: A Political Theory of Legal Integration’ (1993) 47
International Organization 41–76; Anne-Marie Slaughter and William Burke-White,
‘The Future of International Law is Domestic (or, The EuropeanWay of Law)’ (2006) 47
Harvard International Law Journal 327–52.
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States.12 International Relations (IR) scholars too have long been work-
ing on diffusion theories in organizational structures.13 The empirical
data reveal from the mid-twentieth century onward, growing similarity
in organizational form and function within a range of speciﬁc policy
areas including public healthcare, education, and managing the natural
environment.14 Such similarity constitutes a puzzle. Why is there such a
degree of worldwide homogeneity in how societies organize themselves,
given the great difference in local conditions and requirements?
Some sociologists predict that weaker States, often on the periphery
of the world system, will emulate the policies and organizations of
the post powerful and advanced States.15 This sociological institution-
alism has been criticized for offering an account of ‘world culture
march[ing] effortlessly and facelessly across the globe’.16 Local condi-
tions or ‘cultural ﬁlters’17 – policy requirements, domestic politics and
national legal culture – may reasonably be expected to shape how trans-
national rules are received and adopted by States. Here constructivism in
IR is most useful as it seeks to explain how ideas spread across borders
and take effect in national policy communities. constructivists see a
world that is substantially shaped by the identities of actors and the
ideas they hold about how they should organize and act (i.e., norms).18
One such example is the norm of sovereignty, which deﬁnes the primary
12 Maryellen Fullerton, ‘A Tale of Two Decades: War Refugees and Asylum Policy in the
European Union’ (2011) 10 Washington University Global Studies Law Review 87–132.
13 Emily Goldman and Leslie Eliason (eds.), The Diffusion of Military Technology and Ideas
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2003); Alexander Betts (ed.), Global Migration
Governance (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011); Manners, ‘Normative Power
Europe’.
14 I am grateful to Theo Farrell for pointing me to this literature. John Meyer, David Frank,
Ann Hironaka, Evan Schofer and Nancy Tuma, ‘The Structuring of a World
Environmental Regime, 1870–1990’ (1997) 51 International Organization 623–51;
Francisco Ramirez and John Meyer, ‘Comparative Education: The Social Construction
of the Modern World System’ (1980) 6 Annual Review of Sociology 369–99.
15 Paul DiMaggio and Walter Powell, ‘The Iron Cage Revisited: Institutionalism
Isomorphism and Collective Rationality’, in P. Powell and W. DiMaggio (eds.), The
New Institutionalism in Organizational Analysis (Chicago: Chicago University Press,
1991), pp. 41–62.
16 Martha Finnemore, ‘Norms, Culture and World Politics: Insights from Sociology’s
Institutionalism’ (1996) 52 International Organization 325–47, at 339.
17 Manners, ‘Normative Power Europe’, at 245.
18 Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics. See also David Armstrong, Theo Farrell
and He´lène Lambert, International Law and International Relations (2nd edn,
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), pp. 100–10.
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unit of political organization in the modern world, and rights and duties
of that unit.19
Much overlap exists between these bodies of scholarship (particularly,
law and IR).20 Accordingly, this Introduction, which is written from a
law perspective, draws on IR (and sociological) theory on policy and
social diffusion in the modern world, with the aim of identifying key
pointers for chapter authors to consider in their case studies.21
According to Twining, ‘diffusion is a pervasive, continuing phenom-
enon’;22 it ‘refers to a vast and complex range of phenomena’,23 and
raises ‘questions about occasions, motives, agents, recipients, pathways,
obstacles, trialability, observability, impact, and so on’.24 Twining cor-
rectly notes that this process of diffusion is ‘typically a reciprocal rather
than a one-way process’, hence early inﬂuences of ‘Western legal tradi-
tions lose their pre-eminence’.25 Crucially, he explains that ‘processes of
diffusion are nearly always mediated through local actors’.26
Constructivists in IR have produced numerous accounts of how
norms evolve and spread. Most accounts emphasize the role of norm
entrepreneurs and advocates in promoting new norms, and the role of
transnational networks (professional, scientiﬁc, legal or advocacy) in
diffusing norms.27 Norm diffusion usually involves a process of social-
ization, where States (or policy communities within them) are pressured
and/or persuaded to adopt the new norm, and internalization, where the
new norm is embedded in the laws, codes and practices of the adopting
19 Samuel Barkin and Bruce Cronin, ‘The State and the Nation: Changing Norms and the Rules
of Sovereignty in International Relations’ (1994) 48 International Organization 107–30.
20 See Anne-Marie Slaughter, A New World Order (Princeton: Princeton University Press,
2004).
21 In the academic debate relating to the spread of ideas, sociologists and IR scholars have
generally referred to the terminology of ‘diffusion’ and ‘socialization’, whereas lawyers
have referred to ‘reception’ and ‘transplants’. Some socio-legal scholars do however
embrace the term ‘diffusion’; see Twining, ‘Diffusion of Law: A Global Perspective’ and
‘Social Science and Diffusion of Law’.
22 Twining, ‘Social Science andDiffusion of Law’, 215, referring to the work of Patrick Glenn.
23 Ibid., 240. 24 Ibid., 228. 25 Ibid., 215–16, referring to the work of Patrick Glenn.
26 Twining, ‘Diffusion of Law: A Global Perspective’, 26. On the role of electoral mecha-
nisms in shaping patterns of policy diffusion, see Katerina Linos, ‘Diffusion through
Democracy’ (2011) 55 American Journal of Political Science 678–95.
27 Peter Haas, ‘Epistemic Communities and International Policy Coordination’ (1992) 41
International Organization 1–35; Thomas Risse, ‘Ideas Do Not Float Freely:
Transnational Coalitions, Domestic Structures, and the End of the Cold War’ (1994)
48 International Organization 165–214; Preslava Stoeva, New Norms and Knowledge in
World Politics (Abingdon, Oxon.: Routledge, 2010).
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community.28 Crucially, constructivists ﬁnd that speciﬁc norms are
often ‘localized’ in the process of selective adoption by States.29
We may draw on this scholarship to identify the processes whereby non-
EU States emulate European asylum law and protection practice. There are
two main drivers behind the spread of norms. The ﬁrst driver for emulation
is new challenges and uncertainty. This emulation driver draws on rational
processes and the need to succeed.30 Where States are faced with new
challenges and are uncertain about how to tackle them, then they go ﬁshing
for ideas. According to this perspective, diffusion offers a solution to a
problem.31 The second driver for emulation is normative and stems from
reputation and the growing of transnational professional standards
(through association or bilateral agreements with the EU, for instance).
This emulation driver draws on social processes and the need to conform.32
Here, diffusion appears more as an ideology; the underlying motivation of
the diffusion is its value.33 In law, including refugee law, a transnational
professional identity, composed of expertise and norms, has developed that
is shared by organizational actors the world over.34 In the context of our
study on refugee law and protection practice, the EU, as a major source of
new ideas and professional standards, fulﬁls a leading role in this respect.
State emulation is also a process of norm diffusion. Here constructivist
studies point to three facilitating factors. The ﬁrst of these is the degree of
ﬁt between the foreign norm and local requirements, politics, laws and
culture35 – in other words, the ‘context’.36 The second, as noted already, is
28 Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink, ‘International Norm Dynamics and Political
Change’ (1998) 52 International Organization 887–917; Thomas Risse, Steven Ropp and
Kathryn Sikkink, The Power of Human Rights: International Norms and Domestic
Change (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999).
29 Amitav Acharya, ‘How Ideas Spread: Whose Norms Matter? Norm Localization and
Institutional Change in Asian Regionalism’ (2004) 58 International Organization 239–75.
30 Paul DiMaggio and Walter Powell, ‘The Iron Cage Revisited: Institutionalism Isomorphism
and Collective Rationality’, in Powell and DiMaggio (eds.), New Institutionalism, pp. 41–62.
31 Twining, ‘Diffusion of Law: A Global Perspective’, 30.
32 DiMaggio and Powell, ‘Iron Cage Revisited’.
33 Twining, ‘Diffusion of Law: A Global Perspective’, 30.
34 Betts, Global Migration Governance.
35 Jeffrey Checkel, ‘Norms, Institutions, and National Identity in Contemporary Europe’ (1999)
50 International Studies Quarterly 83–111, at 86–7; Andrew Cortell and James Davis,
‘Understanding the Domestic Impact of International Norms: A Research Agenda’ (2000) 2
International Studies Review 65–90.
36 Twining, ‘Social Science andDiffusion of Law’, 211 discussing the work of Otto Kahn-Freund.
See also the discussion on ‘ﬁt’ and ‘proximity’, in Katerina Linos, ‘When Do Policy
Innovations Spread? Lessons for Advocates of Lesson-Drawing’ (2006) 119 Harvard Law
european refugee law & transnational emulation 7
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the presence and role of transnational policy, legal or advocacy networks in
‘transmitting’ the foreign norms. The third facilitating factor is the role of
advocacy groups and other stakeholders in ‘pushing’ for normative change
from within the country in question.37 This view of diffusion captures the
more romantic view that law is embedded holistically in legal culture, and so
reception can be problematic.38
Aside from the academic issues that result from looking at the spread and
effect of European protection law worldwide, there are also important
practical imperatives. Policy makers, but also legislators (in the EU and in
countries around the world), want to know why the adoption of a legal rule
or practice is not working, and when – and under what conditions – it will
work. When faced with a choice, they also want to know how to go about
choosing a particular rule or practice.39 Domestic courts and judges want to
know when it is appropriate to use foreign law.40 Others (e.g., activists,
UNHCR, human rights NGOs, etc.) want to know how to resist a restrictive
rule or practice.
By examining seven case studies in detail, this book aims to remedy the
lack of a sustained empirical base – identiﬁed by Twining as ‘the Achilles
heel of comparative law’41 – in the area of (diffusion of) refugee law.
B Key trends in European refugee law
Ever since the Single European Act (1987), issues of asylum and immi-
gration have been part of the debate relating to the creation of an Internal
Review 1467–87. For different views on commonalities and distinctiveness between legal
cultures, see, for instance, Roger Cotterrell, Law, Culture and Society (Aldershot: Ashgate,
2006); David Nelken, ‘Puzzling Out Legal Cultures: A Comment on Blankenburg’, in
David Nelken (ed.), Comparing Legal Cultures (Aldershot: Ashgate, 1997), pp. 58–88;
Pierre Legrand, ‘European Legal Systems Are Not Converging’ (1996) 45 International and
Comparative Law Quarterly 52–81.
37 Anne-Marie Clarke, Diplomacy of Conscience: Amnesty International and Changing
Human Rights Norms (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002); Anne Klotz,
Norms in International Relations (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1995).
38 Twining, ‘Diffusion of Law: A Global Perspective’, 30.
39 Ibid., 10; Twining, ‘Social Science and Diffusion of Law’, 217.
40 Goodwin-Gill and Lambert, Limits of Transnational Law. See also Christopher McCrudden,
‘A Common Law of Human Rights?: Transnational Judicial Conversations on Constitutional
Rights’ (2000) 20 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 499–532; Sir Basil Markesinis and
Jörg Fedtke, Judicial Recourse to Foreign Law: A New Source of Inspiration? (London:
University College London and Austin: University of Texas: 2006); John Bell, ‘The
Argumentative Status of Foreign Legal Arguments’ (2012) 8 Utrecht Law Review 8–19.
41 Twining, ‘Social Science and Diffusion of Law’, 240.
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Market and the abolition of internal borders by 1992.42 A special group
of senior civil servants (the Ad Hoc Immigration Group) was set up
to reinforce external border controls and limit access into Europe. As
early as 1987, this Group adopted an agreement to impose penalties on
carriers responsible for bringing undocumented aliens into the
European Community (EC) (1987). The Ad Hoc Group also adopted
two conventions in 1990: the Convention determining the state respon-
sible for examining the applications for asylum lodged in one of the
Member States of the EC (Dublin Convention),43 and the Convention on
the gradual abolition of internal borders (Schengen Convention).44 Both
conventions contained almost identical provisions on asylum. Shortly
afterwards, and clearly conﬁrming the priorities of the EC in the ﬁeld of
asylum at the time (namely, internal security and external border con-
trol), the EC Immigration Ministers agreed on the text of two
Resolutions and one Conclusion (1992): the Resolution on manifestly
unfounded applications, the Resolution of a harmonized approach to
questions concerning host third countries and the problem of readmis-
sion agreements, and the Conclusion on countries where there is gen-
erally no serious risk of persecution.45
The Amsterdam Treaty (1997)46 was a major milestone in the creation
of a European asylum policy through the introduction of EC competence
in asylum and immigration issues in a new ‘title’ dealing with an area of
freedom, security and justice. However, this ‘title’was kept separate from
the traditional provisions relating to the free movement of persons.47
Equally important, therefore, were the Tampere European Council
Conclusions, which promised a new legal objective for the development
42 Art. 8A(2) Single EuropeanAct (now art. 26(2) TFEU) deﬁnes the internal market as ‘an area
without internal frontiers in which the free movement of goods, persons, services and capital
is ensured in accordance with the provisions of this Treaty’ (OJ 1987 No. L 169).
43 Convention determining the state responsible for examining applications for asylum
lodged in one of the member states of the European Communities (Dublin Convention,
OJ 1997 No. C 254/1).
44 The Schengen acquis – Convention Implementing the Schengen Agreement of 14 June
1985 between the Governments of the States of the Benelux Economic Union, the
Federal Republic of Germany and the French Republic on the gradual abolition of
checks at their common borders (OJ 2000 No. L 239/19).
45 See generally Ingrid Boccardi, Europe and Refugees: Towards an EU Asylum Policy
(Alphen aan den Rijn, the Netherlands: Kluwer Law International, 2002), pp. 27–60.
46 OJ 1997 No. C 340.
47 Steve Peers and Nicola Rogers (eds.), EU Immigration and Asylum Law: Text and
Commentary (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff, 2006), p. 83 (referring to Title IV as the
‘ghetto’ provision).
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of a common asylum and immigration policy, namely, the respect of
human rights. For the ﬁrst time, a commitment was made to freedom
based on human rights, democratic institutions and the rule of law.48 In
particular, the right to ‘move freely throughout the Union . . . in con-
ditions of security and justice’ was afﬁrmed.49 This freedom was to be
granted to all, which meant that the EU had to develop common policies
on asylum and immigration.50 The Tampere summit was a key moment
in the development of common asylum and immigration policies as it
was then that these policies became founded on respect for human
rights, and not in the Internal Market. The Union was acquiring a new
human rights dimension, and as pointed out by Boccardi, ‘[i]t was not
coincidence that the Tampere Council also instituted the body that was
going to draft the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights’.51 That also
marked the moment when it was ﬁnally acknowledged that the EU
needed a Common European Asylum System (CEAS), a hugely ambi-
tious project, and that this was to be created by 2012.
This project has so far proceeded in two stages. In stage one (1999–
2005 – the Tampere Programme), a common legislative framework was
adopted on the basis of international and Europe-wide standards. Six key
legislative instruments were adopted during this ﬁrst phase: the Asylum
Procedures Directive,52 the Qualiﬁcation Directive,53 the Dublin
Regulation,54 the Reception of Asylum Seekers Directive,55 the
Eurodac Regulation56 and the Temporary Protection Directive.57 Stage
48 Tampere European Council, Presidency Conclusions, point 1. 49 Ibid., point 2.
50 Ibid., point 3. 51 Boccardi, Europe and Refugees, p. 174.
52 Council Directive 2005/85/EC of 1 December 2005 on minimum standards on procedures in
member states for granting and withdrawing refugee status (OJ 2005 No. L 326/13).
53 Council Directive 2004/83/EC of 29 April 2004 on minimum standards for the qual-
iﬁcation and status of third-country nationals or stateless persons as refugees or as
persons who otherwise need international protection and the content of the protection
granted (OJ 2004 No. L 304/12).
54 Council Regulation 2003/343/EC of 18 February 2003 establishing the criteria and mecha-
nisms for determining the member state responsible for examining an asylum application
lodged in one of the member states by a third-country national (OJ 2003 No. L 50/1).
55 Council Directive 2003/9/EC of 27 January 2003 laying down minimum standards for
the reception of asylum seekers (OJ 2003 No. L 31/18).
56 Council Regulation 2000/2725/EC of 11 December 2000 concerning the establishment
of ‘Eurodac’ for the comparison of ﬁngerprints for the effective application of the Dublin
Convention (OJ 2000 No. L 316/1).
57 Council Directive 2001/55/EC of 20 July 2001 on minimum standards for giving
temporary protection in the event of a mass inﬂux of displaced persons and on measures
promoting a balance of efforts between member states in receiving such persons and
bearing the consequences thereof (OJ 2001 No. L 212/12).
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two (2005–12, still ongoing – the Hague and Stockholm Programmes)58
seeks to harmonize asylum procedures in the EU, increase cooperation
between EU States on managing their external borders, and increase the
standards of protection in some of the adopted common legislation
(through recast instruments currently being adopted).59
In summary, over the past two decades, European asylum policy and
law have evolved from soft law (namely, resolutions and conclusions) to
hard law instruments (namely, treaty, charter, regulations and direc-
tives). Despite different legal traditions and systems, the EU has codiﬁed
a regional legal framework of international protection applicable to
Member States. The emerging CEAS contains a number of key, positive
substantive and procedural rules, most notably, the recognition of the
‘right to asylum’ in the EU, which goes beyond protection from refoule-
ment,60 but also the recognition of non-State agents of persecution,
gender-based persecution and the codiﬁcation of subsidiary protection
and temporary protection, all of which are based on State practice and/or
national legislation,61 and, ﬁnally, the recognition of basic standards of
58 Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament of 10
May 2005 – The Hague Programme: ten priorities for the next ﬁve years. The Partnership for
European renewal in the ﬁeld of Freedom, Security and Justice (COM(2005) 184 ﬁnal, OJ 2005
No. C 236). Also, EuropeanCouncil, the StockholmProgramme –An open and secure Europe
serving and protecting citizens (OJ 2010 No. C 115/1).
59 E.g., Directive 2011/95/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13
December 2011 on standards for the qualiﬁcation of third-country nationals or stateless
persons as beneﬁciaries of international protection, for a uniform status for refugees or
for persons eligible for subsidiary protection, and for the content of the protection
granted (recast).
60 Art. 18, Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (OJ 2000 No. C 364/1)
and Recast Qualiﬁcation Directive 2011/95/EU, Recital 16. See Maria-Teresa Gil-Bazo,
‘The Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union and the Right to be Granted
Asylum in the Union’s Law’ (2008) 27 Refugee Survey Quarterly 33–52; UNHCR’s
written observations in CJEU Joined Cases C-411/10 and C-493/10, para. 31.
61 Subsidiary protection refers to ‘internal mechanisms adopted in order to comply with
the 2004 EU Qualiﬁcation Directive’. It is distinct from complementary protection,
which refers to ‘other forms of protection, created by national law, different from
refugee status and from subsidiary protection status, conferred on persons whose
return is impossible or undesirable’. See ECRE, ‘Complementary Protection in
Europe’, July 2009, p. 4. Temporary protection on the other hand refers to ‘a procedure
of exceptional character to provide, in the event of a mass inﬂux or imminent mass
inﬂux of displaced persons . . . immediate and temporary protection’ (art. 2(a), Council
Directive 2001/55/EC on temporary protection). See generally Jane McAdam,
Complementary Protection in International Refugee Law (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2007).
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reception (e.g., detention) for asylum seekers.62 Yet, signiﬁcant gaps and
shortcomings also characterize the CEAS: a tendency towards more
exceptions and derogations to established standards (e.g., limitation of
the application of the Refugee Convention deﬁnition to third-country
nationals,63 the internal ﬂight alternative concept, the safe third country,
ﬁrst country of asylum and safe country of origin principles, manifestly
unfounded applications), restrictive access to international protection
through delocalized migration control (e.g., discussions on extraterrito-
rial processing), the Dublin rule (according to which only one Member
State is responsible for determining an asylum application and corre-
sponding transfers), increased securitization (e.g., through detention,
deportation and denaturalization procedures), and a tendency, in some
countries, to resort to granting subsidiary protection rather than refugee
status,64 with the former still providing fewer rights than the latter.65
These norms and trends are further discussed below.
1 Processes of securitization
The literature on asylum in Europe generally points towards a strength-
ening of border controls as the EUMember States attempt to consolidate
their refugee determination procedures, with the result that access to
62 Council Directive 2003/9/EC of 27 January 2003 laying down minimum standards for
the reception of asylum seekers. Note that the Reception Directive does not contain an
upper limit on the length of detention, only the Returns Directive does (Directive 2008/
115/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 2008 on
common standards and procedures in member states for returning illegally staying
third-country nationals (OJ 2008 No. L 348/98), art. 15(5),(6)).
63 The Qualiﬁcation Directive limits the scope of international protection to ‘third country
nationals and stateless persons’ only. This led the House of Lords Select Committee on
the EU to observe: ‘for a major regional grouping of countries such as the Union to adopt
a regime apparently limiting the scope of the Geneva Convention among themselves
would set a most undesirable precedent in the wider international/global context’
(Deﬁning Refugee Status and Those in Need of International Protection (London: TSO,
2002), para. 54, cited in McAdam, Complementary Protection, p. 60).
64 This is the case, for instance, of Bulgaria, Italy, Cyprus, Malta, Poland, Slovakia, Finland
and Sweden.
65 Directive 2011/95/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 December
2011 on standards for the qualiﬁcation of third-country nationals or stateless persons as
beneﬁciaries of international protection, for a uniform status for refugees or for persons
eligible for subsidiary protection, and for the content of the protection granted. This
recast Directive is a considerable improvement from the original Directive of 2004, but
still today the right to residence permits (art. 24) and the right to social welfare (art. 29)
remain unequally protected.
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protection systems by those persons entitled to beneﬁt from them is
being denied.66 These norms are being complemented with deteriorating
reception standards, increased levels of social control, heightened polic-
ing and stricter detention policies, and the growing sophistication of
expulsion procedures.67 Any of these could potentially spread to and be
adopted in countries beyond the EU (and has already occurred in some
cases, as the case study chapters show).
Guild has long provided a powerful critique of the protection provided
by EU Member States to refugees and of their responsibilities towards
refugees.68 She describes the protection of refugees in the EU as a process
of ‘deterritorialisation of protection obligations’ for refugees already in, or
seeking to enter, the EU.69 The geographical EU common territory being no
longer the object of sovereign responsibilities, there is now ‘space for an
opportunistic exclusion of protection responsibilities which are tied to
sovereignty’.70 She ﬁnds that this gap has been ﬁlled to some extent by
human rights law, and the European Convention on Human Rights
(ECHR) in particular. Both legal orders, the EU and the ECHR, comple-
ment each other, but they are separate. Hence, EU Member States remain
accountable to the European Court of Human Rights for their protection
obligations under EU law whenever these obligations involve a right or
obligation under the ECHR. Recent landmark judgments clearly illustrate
this point. The most notable example isMSS v. Belgium and Greece,71 a case
involving the transfer of an Afghan asylum seeker from Belgium to Greece
in accordance with EU law. The European Court of Human Rights held that
a presumption of safety, even where created by EU law (under the Dublin
Regulation II),72 should never be conclusive but rebuttable. Since Belgium
‘knew or ought to have known’ that MSS had no guarantee that his asylum
66 E.g., Boccardi, Europe and Refugees. Elspeth Guild, Security and Migration in the 21st
Century (Cambridge: Polity, 2009). Red Cross/EU Ofﬁce, ‘Position paper on the Right to
Access to International Protection’, Brussels, 17 November 2011.
67 Laura Barnett, ‘Global Governance and the Evolution of the International Refugee
Regime’ (2002) 14 International Journal of Refugee Law 238–62, at 253.
68 E.g., Elspeth Guild, ‘Seeking Asylum: Storm Clouds between International
Commitments and EU Legislative Measures’ (2004) 29 European Law Review 198–218.
69 Elspeth Guild, ‘The Europeanisation of Europe’s Asylum Policy’ (2006) 18 International
Journal of Refugee Law 630–51.
70 Ibid., 631.
71 MSS v. Belgium and Greece, App. No. 30696/09, judgment of 21 January 2011.
72 Council Regulation (EC) No. 343/2003 of 18 February 2003 establishing the criteria and
mechanisms for determining the member state responsible for examining an asylum
application lodged in one of the member states by a third-country national (OJ 2003
No. L 50/1) (Dublin II Regulation).
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application would be seriously examined in Greece, and the Belgian author-
ities had the means to refuse to transfer him, article 3 ECHR had been
violated.73 Belgium should have veriﬁed how the Greek authorities applied
their legislation on asylum in practice, not just assume that MSS would be
treated in conformity with the ECHR. Likewise inHirsi and Others v. Italy, a
case involving illegal migrants from Somalia and Eritrea and their ‘push-
back’ to Libya (from where they came) by the Italian police, the European
Court of Human Rights held that the Italian authorities ‘knew or ought to
have known’ that irregular migrants would be exposed to treatment con-
trary to article 3 ECHR if returned to Libya;74 and that the authorities
should have found out about the treatment to which the applicants would be
exposed after their return (in practice), and not just assume that Libya’s
international commitments under human rights treaties would be respected
(in law). Thus, there can be no hiding behind notions of common territory
and loss of sovereignty before the European Court of Human Rights, which
‘has pushed in the direction of a “collectivisation” of responsibility’.75
Gilbert, too, is critical of the EU approach towards refugee protection for
having inextricably ‘fused’ refugee protection and immigration control: an
immigration control mentality is driving refugee policy.76 Consequently,
EU States will continue to choose who should be protected within the EU,
and currently this category of people is decreasing in number.77 Another
forceful critique is provided in Chapter 9 of this volume, with Jean-François
Durieux arguing that the EU asylum system, which is based on an internal
market’s logic, threatens the speciﬁcity of the Refugee Convention and
therefore the ﬁgure of the refugee.
2 Improved standards of refugee protection?
Thielemann and El-Enany argue that, until recently, EU asylum laws have
‘reﬂect[ed] restrictive trends similar to those in other parts of the world’.78
73 MSS v. Belgium and Greece, para. 358.
74 Hirsi and Others v. Italy, App. No. 27765/09, judgment of 23 February 2012, para.131.
75 Guild, ‘Europeanisation’, 630.
76 Geoff Gilbert, ‘Is Europe Living up to Its Obligations to Refugees?’ (2004) 15 European
Journal of International Law 963–87, at 987.
77 Ibid. See also Nadine El-Enany, ‘Who Is the New European Refugee?’ (2008) 33
European Law Review 313–35.
78 Eiko Thielemann and Nadine El-Enany, ‘Beyond Fortress Europe? How European
Cooperation Has Strengthened Refugee Protection’, paper presented at European Union
Studies Association’s 11th Biennial International Conference, Los Angeles, 23–25 April
2009, p. 22.
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However, looking speciﬁcally at the two most contested EU Directives, the
Asylum Procedures Directive and the Returns Directive, they dismiss the
claim that European cooperation is driving protection standards down, on
the grounds that it is unsubstantiated by the evidence.79 They argue instead
that European cooperation in this area ‘has curtailed regulatory competition
and in doing so had largely halted the race to the bottom in protection
standards in the EU’.80 They further argue that these new EU protection
standards are not only improved standards in relation to previous standards
in the Member States, but also in relation to comparable non-EU countries
of equivalent wealth and development, such as Norway, the US, Canada and
Australia.81 For instance, the highly contested concept of the ‘safe third
country’, enshrined in the Asylum Procedures Directive and the Returns
Directive, also operates in these four countries. Another instance is the use of
detention practices in the context of return: restrictive detention practices
currently exist in the EU under the Returns Directive, but also in Australia,
theUS, Canada and Switzerland (Norway being an exception, as it appears to
provide better guarantees against arbitrariness).82
For the purpose of this volume, the relevant and important argument
advanced by Thielemann and El-Enany is that EU refugee policy has not
become a uniquely restrictive policy as compared with other non-EU
OECD countries. Restrictive practices found in the EU asylum regime
are also found in the regimes of non-EUOECD countries.83 They do not,
however, consider the issue whether this is so because of the effect of EU
law on these countries (including the practice of individual EU Member
States). They predict that the rights-enhancing trends noted in EU policy
making are expected to continue (their argument is supported by the
new round of recast Directives aimed at improving minimum standards
ahead of the anticipated harmonization), while other OECD countries
have leaned towards the adoption of new restrictive policies with no
(regionally) agreed minimum standards to resist against such actions.84
Some of the case study ﬁndings in this volume in fact conﬁrm this
argument (e.g., Australia, Canada, Israel and Latin America), and the
implications for this will be examined further in the concluding
Chapter 10.
Geddes makes a similar point, namely, that there is not necessarily
anything distinct or unique about Europe when comparing responses to
79 Thielemann and El-Enany, ‘Refugee Protection as a Collective Action Problem’, at 215–17.
80 Ibid., 216. 81 Ibid., 217–20. 82 Ibid. 83 Ibid., 226–7. 84 Ibid., 219 and 226–7.
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migration and asylum problems with those in the US and Australia.85
Geddes considers ‘the attempts by the EU and its Member States to
inﬂuence migration from, and the migration policies of, non-EU
States’,86 through various forms of dialogue and cooperation, partner-
ships with countries of origin and third countries, and bilateral and
multilateral forums.87 He sees value in viewing this as a process of the
EU ‘impos[ing] its migration and asylum priorities on non-Member
States’. He asks ‘what incentive is there for non-member states to agree
to participate in such processes if the onus is on them to adapt to EU
requirements?’88 Geddes observes clear parallels between the exclusion-
ary practices ‘being pursued by EU states and those strategies of similar
non-European States’.89
At this juncture, it is necessary to clarify that the purpose of this
volume is less about mapping the transplantation of some of the EU
refugee norms in countries with which it has formal arrangements, such
as association or other bilateral agreements, as it is to look at the effects
of EU refugee law by way of its more ‘natural’ or ‘cultural’ diffusion into
the legal systems of non-EU countries. Indeed, even in countries with
which the EU has formal arrangements, such as Switzerland and Israel,
the success of diffusion is very much dependent on the facilitating factors
identiﬁed above (namely, the ‘ﬁt’, the ‘transmitter’ and the ‘push’) and
local requirements. It may also be recalled that the aim of the book is to
explore whether or not restrictive European concepts are being adopted
and adapted the world over, based on the evidence found so far; in other
words, it is to take stock at this point in time of what has happened, and
then use this as a point of comparison for what might follow.
3 Exceptions and derogations to established
international standards
Notwithstanding the arguments made by Thielemann and El-Enany, it
cannot be denied that certain standards enshrined in EU asylum legislation
are not in compliance with international refugee law and/or international
human rights law. As strongly expressed by the European Council on
Refugees and Exiles (ECRE): ‘The result of the ﬁrst phase of harmonization
has been disappointing; the level of protection granted to asylum seekers
85 Geddes, Immigration and European Integration, pp. 183–4. 86 Ibid., p. 170.
87 Ibid., p. 176. 88 Ibid., p. 178. 89 Ibid., p. 179.
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and refugees in the EU asylum acquis is generally low.’90 UNHCR, too,
notes that the legislation adopted during the ﬁrst phase of the creation of the
CEAS contains or permits broad exceptions, derogations and ambiguities,
which are partly responsible for the existing divergence in recognition rate
and quality of asylum decision between EU Member States.91 For instance,
both UNHCR and ECRE are critical of the administrative detention of
asylum seekers, which is less regulated than the detention of accused and
convicted criminals. ECRE also recently observed that by allowing Member
States a wide margin of discretion, the Asylum Procedures Directive fails to
ensure common standards across the EU. In some countries, accelerated
asylum procedures have become the rule rather than the exception. The
2009 Commission proposal to recast the Asylum Procedures Directive
proposes signiﬁcant improvements in EU standards with regard to some
key issues, such as the right to a personal interview, training requirements
for staff in asylum authorities, the right to legal assistance and representa-
tion and the right to an effective remedy. However, this proposal is meeting
with resistance in the Council of the EU.92 Furthermore, the recast proposal
maintains the various safe country concepts. The ‘safe country’ concept has
been presented as ‘a new notion of non-refoulement’, one that States were
forced to create in order to deal with the emergence of ‘the potential refugee
or the asylum seeker’ and the subsequent burden on asylum administra-
tions.93 In other words, this concept was invented to send asylum seekers
back from where they had come.94
In summary, the substantive and procedural rules that currently form
the CEAS are impaired by exceptions and derogations to existing inter-
national standards.95 While it is true that some of these rules and
practices are still evolving (through recast instruments currently being
negotiated as well as through judicial interpretation), the focus of this
90 ECRE Memorandum on the occasion of the Belgian Presidency of the EU (July–
December 2010), p. 1.
91 UNHCR’s recommendations to Belgium for its EU Presidency July–December 2010
(June 2010) www.unhcr.org/4c2486579.html (accessed 1 December 2012).
92 At its meeting on 5 January 2012, the Asylum Working Party examined the Council of the
EU Presidency compromise suggestions on an Amended Proposal for a Directive of the
European Parliament and of the Council on common procedures for granting and with-
drawing international protection status (recast) (Doc. 5168/12 ASILE 4 CODEC 50).
93 El-Enany, ‘Who Is the New European Refugee?’, 320.
94 Madeline Garlick, ‘The EU Discussions on Extraterritorial Processing: Solution or
Conundrum?’ (2006) 18 International Journal of Refugee Law 601–29.
95 See Durieux’s arguments on ‘normative conﬂict’ between an EU-speciﬁc ‘genetic mate-
rial’ and the universal regime of refugee protection, in Chapter 9 of this volume.
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book is on key norms of European refugee law that originated over
twenty years ago in State practice and asylum policies, and which are
now squarely codiﬁed in the CEAS (e.g., safe third country, safe country
of origin, subsidiary protection, accelerated procedures and manifestly
unfounded applications). It is notoriously difﬁcult to trace the precise
origin of a legislative rule.96 To overcome this difﬁculty, this volume is
interested in trends (e.g., a set of restrictive or liberal rules, practices or
ideas), rather than speciﬁc rules.97
All but one (the United States) of the selected case studies in this volume
provide clear evidence of these trends or norms having ‘leaked’ beyond
Europe and impacted on refugee law worldwide at some point in time.
(a) Europe’s unique double-judicial check
It is further predicted that other norms likely to spread worldwide are
those which the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) has
ruled upon, particularly, where the ruling concerns a provision of EU law
that enshrines a provision of the Refugee Convention, such as cessation
of refugee status98 or exclusion from refugee status,99 or a provision
relating to subsidiary protection.100 Indeed, once the CJEU answers a
reference for a preliminary ruling in a judgment, this interpretation
carries great weight as EU law – much greater weight than those provi-
sions that have not been interpreted by the CJEU. This pioneering role by
the CJEU is further ampliﬁed by the fact that while the International
Court of Justice is competent, no State has ever requested its involvement
and it is unlikely to ever be used in this way. While it is true that rulings
of the CJEU are authoritative in respect of EU law only (in the sense of
their binding legal force),101 it is less true of their general authority
96 Rosemary Byrne and Andrew Shacknove, ‘The Safe Country Notion in European
Asylum Law’ (1996) 9 Harvard Human Rights Journal 185–228; Rosemary Byrne,
Gregor Noll and Jens Vedsted-Hansen, ‘Understanding Refugee Law in an Enlarged
European Union’ (2004) 15 European Journal of International Law 355–79.
97 Twining talks about ‘patterns relating to law’ (‘Diffusion of Law: AGlobal Perspective’, 5).
98 ECJ, Joined Cases C-175, 176, 178, 179/08, Salahadin Abdulla and Others v. Germany,
ECR [2009] I-1493.
99 CJEU, Joined Cases C-57/09 and C-101/09, Bundesrepublik Deutschland v. B and D,
judgment of 9 November 2010.
100 ECJ, Case C-465/07, Mr and Mrs Elgafaji v. the Dutch Secretary of State for Justice,
judgment of 17 February 2009.
101 As commented by Advocate General Eleanor Sharpston in her Opinion of 4 March
2010 in the Case C-31/09 Bolbol v. Bevándorlási es Állampolgársági Hivatal (Hungarian
Ofﬁce for Immigration and Citizenship).
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(persuasive or not) as rulings from the ﬁrst ever supranational court to
have interpreted provisions of the Refugee Convention. These rulings
will carry enormous weight in generally inﬂuencing the interpretation of
the Refugee Convention – that is, in promoting an interpretation of what
is ‘normal’ interpretation in 26 of the 144 countries signatories to the
Refugee Convention/Protocol. The idea behind this ability to shape
conceptions as ‘normal’ has been identiﬁed as constitutive of Europe’s
normative power.102 In sum, we can predict a ‘jurisprudential glow’ of
the CJEU’s judgments outside the EU.103 In the context of this volume,
this prediction is based on the suggested inﬂuence of the CJEU’s judg-
ment in the landmark caseMr and Mrs Elgafaji v. the Dutch Secretary of
State for Justice, on the US Board of Immigration Appeals, hence this
case is introduced here. Elgafaji was the ﬁrst judgment to be given by the
CJEU (which was then called the ECJ). The Court was asked to answer
two questions referred by the Raad van State (Dutch Council of State)
relating to the scope of subsidiary protection granted by article 15(c)
Qualiﬁcation Directive:104 Does article 15(c) offers supplementary or
merely equivalent protection to article 3 ECHR? If supplementary, what
are the criteria for eligibility to protection under article 15(c)? Following
the opinion of Advocate General Maduro,105 the CJEU ruled that article
15(c) Qualiﬁcation Directive is different in content from article 3 ECHR
(enshrined in article 15(b) Qualiﬁcation Directive), hence the interpre-
tation of these provisions must be carried out independently.106 While
article 15(a) and article 15(b) ‘cover situations in which the applicant for
subsidiary protection is speciﬁcally exposed to the risk of a particular
type of harm’, namely the death penalty, torture, inhuman or degrading
treatment or punishment, article 15(c) ‘covers a more general risk of
102 Manners, ‘Normative Power Europe’, 240. This is discussed further in Chapter 10 of
this volume.
103 Dauvergne, Making People Illegal, p. 150.
104 Chapter V – Qualiﬁcation for Subsidiary Protection
Article 15 – Serious harm
Serious harm consists of:
(a) death penalty or execution; or
(b) torture or inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment of an
applicant in the country of origin; or
(c) serious and individual threat to a civilian’s life or person by reason of
indiscriminate violence in situation of international or internal
armed conﬂict.
105 Delivered on 9 September 2008. 106 Elgafaji, para. 28.
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harm’, namely a ‘threat . . . to a civilian’s life or person’.107 It added that
the threat in question ‘is inherent in a general situation of “international
or internal armed conﬂict” and the reference to “indiscriminate” vio-
lence implies that this term “may extend to people irrespective of their
personal circumstances”’.108
The Court ruled that the existence of a serious and individual threat to
the life or person of an applicant for subsidiary protection is not subject
to the condition that that applicant adduce evidence that he is speciﬁcally
targeted by reason of factors particular to his personal circumstances; the
existence of such a threat can exceptionally be considered to be estab-
lished where the degree of indiscriminate violence characterising the
armed conﬂict taking place . . . reaches such as high level that substantial
grounds are shown for believing that a civilian, returned to the relevant
country or, as the case may be, to the relevant region, would, solely on
account of his presence in the territory of that country or region, face a
real risk of being subject to that threat.109
It further related the ‘level of indiscriminate violence’ with the ‘level of
individualization’ as regards the standard of proof – they are inversely
proportional: ‘the more the applicant is able to show that he is speciﬁ-
cally affected by reason of factors particular to his personal circum-
stances, the lower the level of indiscriminate violence required for him
to be eligible for subsidiary protection’.110
In sum, the interpretation provided by the CJEU of the word ‘indi-
vidual’ in article 15(c) Qualiﬁcation Directive means that there is no
need for the applicant to demonstrate that s/he is individually or ‘specif-
ically’ targeted in order to enjoy the protection of article 15(c). Rather,
the importance of article 15(c) is its ability to provide protection from
serious risks that are situational, rather than individual. This interpre-
tation, which rejects a high degree of individualization, must be praised
for it is in full compliance with both international refugee law111 and
international human rights law,112 and echoes the views of the UNHCR,
107 Ibid., paras. 32–4. 108 Ibid., para. 34. 109 Ibid., para. 45; see also para. 35.
110 Ibid., para. 39.
111 Although not necessarily state practice, which often requires that the asylum seeker be
‘deliberately targeted’ (e.g., R v. SSHD, ex parte Adan and Aitseguer, House of Lords,
judgment of 19 December 2000).
112 Since its judgment in Salah Sheek v. the Netherlands, App. No. 1948/04, judgment of 11
January 2007, the European Court of Human Rights no longer requires an individual to
be singled out or targeted. See also NA v. United Kingdom, App. No. 25904/07, judg-
ment of 17 July 2008; and Suﬁ and Elmi v. United Kingdom, App. Nos. 8319/07 and
11449/07, judgment of 28 June 2011.
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which recommended that the EU legislator delete the term ‘individual’ in
article 15(c) Qualiﬁcation Directive.113
This case clearly illustrates the CJEU’s awareness of the conﬂicting
dimensions of EU asylum policy.114 From a human rights (and refugee
protection) perspective, the interpretation given by the CJEU in Elgafaji
makes absolute sense: subsidiary protection is made effective by inter-
preting article 15(c) as offering something more than article 15(b) (or
3 ECHR), and international protection is to be granted where a risk of
harm to human rights is likely to arise without requiring that an indi-
vidually be personally targeted. This interpretation is in harmony with
the case law of the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg. The
latter indeed recognized that cases could arise where a general situation
of violence in a country of destination is of ‘a sufﬁcient level of intensity’
that removal to it would necessarily breach article 3 ECHR.115 From a
security (or control of the external borders of the EU) viewpoint, this
ruling too makes perfect sense: the CJEU ‘entrusted the [national author-
ities] with a key aspect of article 15(c), namely [the assessment of the
level of indiscriminate violence,] the turning point at which indiscrimi-
nate violence becomes an exceptional situation’.116
The ECHR and the case law of the European Court of Human Rights
further inﬂuence the interpretation of EU refugee law on the principle of non-
refoulement.117 This is the case in particular when provisions of the EU
Charter of Fundamental Rights or of CEAS law overlapwith provisions of the
113 UNHCR also recommended that this term be deleted from Recital (26), according to
which: ‘Risks to which a population of a country or of the population is generally
exposed do normally not create in themselves an individual threat which would qualify
as serious harm.’ Note that article 15 (as well as Recital 26, now Recital 35) has been left
untouched in the Recast Directive 2011/95/EU of 13 December 2011.
114 Koen Lenaerts, ‘The Contribution of the European Court of Justice to the Area of
Freedom, Security and Justice’ (2010) 59 International and Comparative Law Quarterly
255–301, at 296.
115 European Court of Human Rights, NA v. United Kingdom, App. No. 25904/07, judg-
ment of 17 July 2008, para.115. And now for an application of this ﬁnding to
Mogadishu (Somalia), see European Court of Human Rights, Suﬁ and Elmi v. United
Kingdom.
116 Lenaerts, ‘Contribution of the European Court of Justice’, at 297.
117 This is a two-way process. In MSS v. Belgium and Greece, the Grand Chamber of the
European Court of Human Rights referred to EU legislation as an express source of law
for its judgment; this is novel but not unexpected because the European Court of
Human Rights often looks at consensus or near consensus, or for international
norms reﬂecting a high degree of agreement.
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ECHR. Regarding the Charter,118 the CJEU recently granted special signiﬁ-
cance to article 3 ECHR and its case law (particularly inMSS v. Belgium and
Greece)119 when interpreting the corresponding article 4 of the Charter.120 It
regarded article 4 of the Charter as imposing the same level of protection as
article 3 ECHR.121 Regarding CEAS law, particularly the Qualiﬁcation
Directive, it is generally accepted that protection under article 3 ECHR is
squarely provided by article 15(b) Qualiﬁcation Directive,122 and that the
latter should be interpreted with due regard to the ECHR.123 However,
divergence in views between Luxembourg and Strasbourg prevails when
comparing article 3 ECHR with article 15(c) Qualiﬁcation Directive. The
view from the CJEU (see discussion above) is that article 15(c) has something
more to offer than article 15(b) (which is equivalent to article 3 ECHR) in
terms of protection124 – although what this ‘something more’ is remains
unclear. In contrast, the view from the European Court of Human Rights is
that article 3 ECHR offers ‘comparable protection’ to that afforded under
article 15(c) Qualiﬁcation Directive, since both courts impose an ‘exception-
ality requirement’ when the risk to a person arises in a situation of general
violence.125 Notwithstanding these differences, it is unquestionable that in
118 The EU Charter of Fundamental Rights was approved in 2000 at the Nice summit; it
became binding law following the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty in 2009 (OJ 2007
No. C 306).
119 MSS v. Belgium and Greece.
120 NS v. Secretary of State for the Home Department andME and Others v. Refugee Applications
Commissioner andMinister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform, Joined Cases C-411/10 and
C-493/10 [2011] ECR I-0000, paras. 89 and 91. The case involved asylum seekers from
Afghanistan, Iran and Algeria who had arrived in Greece prior to travelling in the UK and
Ireland, and so raised very similar issues to the caseMSS v. Belgium and Greece. See Advocate
General Trstenjak’s statement that ‘particular signiﬁcance and high importance are to be
attached to the case-law of the European Court of Human Rights in connection with the
interpretation of the Charter of Fundamental Rights, with the result that it must be taken into
consideration in interpreting the Charter’ (para. 146).
121 NS v. Secretary of State for the Home Department and ME and Others v. Refugee
Applications Commissioner and Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform (para.
94). Both art. 3 ECHR and art. 4 EU Charter provide: ‘No one shall be subjected to
torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment’.
122 Art. 15(b) Qualiﬁcation Directive deﬁnes serious harm as ‘torture or inhuman or
degrading treatment or punishment of an applicant in the country of origin’.
123 ECJ, case C-465/07, Elgafaji v. Staatssecretaris van Justitie, 17 February 2009 (OJ 2009,
No. C 90/4, para. 28).
124 Ibid. This view is shared by the UK Upper Tribunal: see AMM and Others (conﬂict;
humanitarian crisis; returnees; FGM) Somalia v. Secretary of State for the Home
Department, CG [2011] UKUT 00445 (IAC).
125 European Court of Human Rights, Suﬁ and Elmi v. United Kingdom, para. 226,
and ECJ, Elgafaji, paras. 37–8. To read more on this, see He´lène Lambert, ‘The
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Europe, the ECHR offers very real added protection against refoulement to
victims of armed conﬂicts who meet neither the requirement of the refugee
deﬁnition (article 1A(2) Refugee Convention), nor article 15(c) Qualiﬁcation
Directive. This is not necessarily the case in other regions. However, where
EU lawmay be better equipped than ECHR law is on the issue of the right to
asylum (and a legal status) following a ﬁnding of violation of refoulement.126
Indeed, the European Court of Human Rights has so far failed to recognize
any further duties (beyond non-refoulement) on the part of Contracting
States, such as to allow access to an asylum procedure or to grant a particular
protection status to persons protected against refoulement. For the European
Court of Human Rights, these remain matters for individual Member
States.127 All that the Strasbourg Court has acknowledged is that asylum
seekers constitute a category of particularly vulnerable people.128 Thus, it
may be argued that the right to asylum by way of guaranteeing access to the
asylum procedure and of granting refugee status is a key element of EU law
(as well as the Refugee Convention)129 but not of ECHR law, which con-
tinues to see the right to asylum purely in terms of protection against
refoulement.130
C Structure of the book
The volume is divided into ten chapters. This chapter (Chapter 1) introdu-
ces the conceptual framework for the book and the necessary tools for
testing the hypothesis that European refugee law is being emulated in
non-EU countries around the world. It identiﬁes two key drivers and
Next Frontier: Expanding Protection in Europe for Victims of Armed Conﬂict and
Indiscriminate Violence’, forthcoming in (2013) International Journal of Refugee Law.
126 Note that for persons coming from another EU Member States, the right to asylum is
subject to the rules on responsibility sharing, rebuttable presumption and transfer
provided in Council Regulation (EC) No. 343/2003 of 18 February 2003. This situation
is discussed fully in Chapter 9 of this volume.
127 In Hirsi et al. v. Italy, App. No. 27765/09, judgment of 23 February 2012, paras. 208–11, the
European Court of Human Rights, having found that the transfer of the applicants exposed
them to the risk of being subjected to ill-treatment in Libya and of being arbitrarily
repatriated to Somalia and Eritrea, held that ‘the Italian Government must take all possible
steps to obtain assurances from the Libyan authorities that the applicants will not be subjected
to treatment incompatible with article 3 of the Convention or arbitrarily repatriated’. See
Violeta Moreno-Lax, ‘Hirsi Jamaa and Others v. Italy or the Strasbourg Court versus
Extraterritorial Migration Control?’ (2012) 12 Human Rights Law Review 574–98.
128 MSS v. Belgium and Greece.
129 UNHCR’s written observations in CJEU Joined Cases C-411/10 and C-493/10, paras.
12–32, and UNHCR’s oral submissions in the same joined cases, para. 12.
130 This issue is further discussed in Chapter 9 of this volume, Part D2.
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three facilitating factors behind the emulation of European protection
norms. The two drivers are new challenges and uncertainty, and reputation
and growing transnational professional standards. The three facilitating
factors are the local context (ﬁt), transnational networks (transmitter) and
advocacy groups (push for change). It further examines basic norms or
trends in European refugee law – namely, restrictive norms, such as the safe
third-country rule and accelerated procedures, and liberal norms, such as
subsidiary protection – for the case study chapters to consider, and presents
Europe’s unique judicial safety mechanisms.
Chapters 2 to 8 cover seven case studies. In each of the chapters, the
primary research question was to explore the effect of European refugee law
in the selected country. To the extent that evidence of emulation was found
to have taken place, the authors were asked to analyse this evidence by
paying particular attention to the key drivers and facilitators elaborated in
Chapter 1, as well as the ‘context’ or local requirements. The chapters are
ordered based on the strength of the evidence found of emulation, starting
with Australia, Latin America and Canada where clear evidence of ‘natural’
emulation is found. These Chapters are followed by the cases of Israel and
Switzerland where strong evidence of ‘formal’ emulation is found. Africa
follows with clear evidence of past (but not of present) emulation, and,
ﬁnally, the United States where no evidence is found.
Chapter 9 provides a cautionary tale of diffusion of European law by
challenging some of our assumptions about EU asylum law (and ECHR
law). It warns against a system (the CEAS) that is based on the logic of an
internal market (namely, mutual trust and free movement) and a
European human rights framework that too often sees protection against
refoulement as an end in and of itself. Durieux argues that these (the
CEAS and the ECHR)must not allow the speciﬁcity of refugee protection
(and of the refugee) to be dislodged in this region.
Drawing on the ﬁndings in each of the case studies, Chapter 10 provides
some conclusions about the emulation of European refugee law around the
world. Thus, it consolidates and summarizes the analysis of the evidence
produced through the various case studies, and it considers the theoretical
implications of this evidence, for international, EU and domestic refugee law.
Through this methodology, we believe that an accurate examination
and evaluation of the global reach of European law in the area of
international protection is possible. It is hoped that through the assess-
ment of the evidence obtained, and the theoretical implications, this
volume will make a signiﬁcant contribution to the debates about the
diffusion of law and the role of the EU as a normative power.
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